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I.

Abstract

Since 2011, the London Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR) has been on the way out for
practitioners and researchers alike due to its manipulation in key bank quotes during
the Great Financial Crisis (GFC). This paper intends to examine key rates being
introduced as LIBOR substitutes, such as SOFR, BSBY, and Ameribor. Specific to its
concern, the paper will back test these rates during times of illiquidity in both their
respective markets and the broader financial markets to determine which rates will be
able to sustain an abnormal drop in transaction volumes. Furthermore, this paper will
try to determine whether a dual benchmark solution is possible in the US Fixed Income
markets. Within this paper, tests have specific success in showing a change in
relationship during negative volume shocks in underlying volumes for both SOFR and
BSBY, but have little success in pairing two rates in a dual benchmark fashion. Further
studies that can build off of work in this paper may include volume shocks on other
Alternative Reference Rates and other ARRs that may be paired in a dual benchmark
solution going forward.
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IV.

Introduction
In Fixed Income markets, or financial markets in general, one of the

most important numbers for the past three decades has been the London
Interbank Offer Rate, or LIBOR. Published daily, LIBOR represented
quotations from many of the largest banks in England that answered the
question, “At what rate could you borrow funds, were you to do so by asking
for and then accept inter-bank offers in a reasonable market size just prior to
11 AM?”1 The most extreme quotations were then cut out and the middle 50%
of quotations were averaged to give a reasonable estimate of interday
borrowing costs between banks.
Following a 2008 report in The Wall Street Journal that alleged multiple
banks fraudulently misquoted their actual overnight financing rates, LIBOR
was on its way out of the door in all sections of financial markets. The report
claimed that these banks quoted much lower rates than their Credit Default
Swap (CDS) spreads indicated, showing that banks would rather not seem as
desperate for liquidity as they actually were during the run-up to the Great
Financial Crisis2. In 2011, LIBOR’s exit timeline was announced and
committees were created for the replacement of “the world’s most important

1

“ICE LIBOR,” ICE LIBOR, accessed January 5, 2022, https://www.theice.com/iba/libor.

Carrick Mollenkamp and Mark Whitehouse, “Study Casts Doubt on Key Rate”, The Wall
Street Journal, May 29, 2008.
2
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financial number”3. In the US, the Federal Reserve created ARRC, or the
Alternative Reference Rates Committee, to identify alternative rates that
could mimic LIBOR in its interbank financing estimates.
The ARRC is composed of many private market participants, all of
whom are affected by the transition from USD LIBOR to an alternative rate,
whether directly or indirectly. By 2017, ARRC had proposed that the Secured
Overnight Financing Rate (SOFR) should take the place of USD LIBOR,
effective by the end of 2021. However, not everybody jumped on board with
SOFR to begin with. Even in 2022, there are still financial organizations
publishing their own rates as an alternative to SOFR, such as Bloomberg and
the American Financial Exchange. Although many financial contracts will be
using SOFR as a reference rate in the near future, it’s still worthy to study the
behavior of these new rates as they relate to relative liquidity and health of
financial markets.
There are marked differences between LIBOR and its proposed
alternatives. For example, LIBOR was quoted on an unsecured basis, meaning
that the rate that was shown had an inherent credit risk premium attached to
the rate. Since SOFR is derived from repo transaction markets, it is inherently
a secured rate (hence, Secured Overnight Financing Rate). Furthermore, a

David Enrich, “Libor: A Eulogy for the World’s Most Important Number”, The Wall Street
Journal, https://www.wsj.com/articles/libor-a-eulogy-for-the-worlds-most-importantnumber-1501170720, July 27, 2017.
3
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major difference between LIBOR and its market-based alternatives is the
publication of the rate. Because LIBOR is quoted on the day before, it is
referred to as an “in advance rate”, meaning that the quotation of the rate on
a specific day is for that same day. In contrast, SOFR and other market-based
approaches to reference rates must quote their rate “in-arrears”, meaning that
the quote for that rate was captured in the previous days’ markets. For this
reason, there’s also evidence that LIBOR and its alternatives should behave
differently during times of crisis and illiquidity.
The largest of these differences is markedly the market-based approach
to this reference rate. LIBOR, as stated before, is a quoted rate that
represented a bank’s “best estimate” at their overnight borrowing costs.
SOFR is constructed through the repo and reverse repo markets. In these
markets, participants borrow funds from one another, promising to pay those
loans back after a certain amount of time. The loans are collateralized through
some sort of security, oftentimes a US Treasury Bond. The borrower promises
to buy back the treasury after a certain period of time, with the difference
between the first purchase price and the second purchase price becoming the
implicit interest rate on that loan. Therefore, these markets are called repo
markets (repo standing for repossession). The specific type of repo
transactions that construct the calculation of SOFR are tri-party repo
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transactions, where the collateral selection, payments, and deliveries are all
outsourced to a third party; hence, “tri-party”4.
There have also been competitor rates to SOFR that their publishers
argue work better than SOFR as a LIBOR replacement. For example, the
Bloomberg Short-Term Bank Yield Index (BSBY) is constructed through
commercial paper (CP) and certificate of deposit (CD) trades between
financial institutions to construct an overnight borrowing rate5. Because of its
similarity to SOFR, such as its in-arrears nature and interday trade
calculation, BSBY has become a main competitor to SOFR in LIBOR’s
replacement. Furthermore, a different rate that wishes to match LIBOR in its
interbank, unsecured characteristics is Ameribor, which is published daily by
the American Financial Exchange. Ameribor, unlike SOFR and BSBY, is an
unsecured rate that reflects the borrowing costs of small-to-medium sized
banks across the country. Much like LIBOR, it reflects interbank borrowing
on an unsecured basis, but considers actual market transactions, rather than
quotes. Because it tracks unsecured borrowing between smaller banks, there
is a possibility that Ameribor could be used in tandem with both SOFR and
BSBY as an alternative.

Lucinda Brickler, Adam Copeland, and Antoine Martin, “Everything You Wanted to Know
About the Tri-Party Repo Market, but Didn’t Know to Ask”, Liberty Street Economics, April 11,
2011.
5 Bloomberg Professional Services, “Bloomberg Short-Term Yield Index Methodology”,
accessed 5 January 2022, https://assets.bbhub.io/professional/sites/10/BSBY-MethodologyDocument-March-30-2021.pdf
4
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This paper intends to add to the discussion and research surrounding
these alternatives rates, primarily those that have shown significant progress
towards their usage in financial markets. For this study, SOFR and the
Bloomberg Short-Term Bank Yield index (BSBY) will be studied during times
of illiquidity in overnight tri-party repo markets to show any aberrant
behavior in said rates. Before that, this paper aims to replicate a study on
BSBY, tested on other alternative reference rates, that showed rate spikes
during important reporting dates for central banks, first studied by Klinger
and Syrstad (2020). Lastly, this paper intends to tackle the question of a dualbenchmark solution to such behavior in markets, seeing as these rates could
be countercyclical in their respective underlying markets.

Murphy 6

V.

Literature Review
This section of the paper intends to give a brief, yet wide overview of

the research being done in the field of LIBOR substitutes to show where this
paper fits in to recent scholarly work. This study is by no means exhaustive,
but it should give the reader an idea of how lively the area is in the realm of
financial research, as well as how the paper can add to the field. For the
relevant literature review, the section has been subdivided into three parts:
studies concerning the relative movement of alternative rate spreads,
challenges of comparing LIBOR to the suggested field of substitutes, and how
practitioners intend to manage the transition from LIBOR to other alternative
rates.

I. Key Variables in the Movement of Alternative Reference Rates
A key motivator in the creation of this paper was a similar study by
Klingler and Syrstad. The in-work examines how the alternative rates SOFR,
SONIA (the Sterling Overnight Average), and ESTR (the Euro Short-Term
Rate) react to certain important dates to Fixed Income markets. Crucially, the
paper studies the effect of regulatory constraints, increases in treasury debt
for associated countries, and changes in their corresponding central bank
reserves. Their research found that regulatory constraints can either move
benchmarks up or down, depending on the lender, while increases in
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treasury debt increased all benchmarks and increases in central bank reserves
also tended to increase benchmark rates. Although this research did not focus
on the liquidity within markets behind the creation of the rates, it did focus
on another topic of this paper: spikes within the rates. On these reporting
dates for regulatory bodies and central banks, each benchmark rate saw a
spike associated with a change in policy. This effectively means that there are
events in which these rates prove to be too sensitive to use as a true
benchmark rate, and where more study is needed. Because of the lack of
research regarding spikes during liquidity crises, this paper can help aide the
discussion of how to solve these incidents1.
Furthermore, Klinger and Syrstad (2020) goes to show how different
LIBOR and its alternatives truly are, which is a point this paper intends to
address. For example, LIBOR has often been noted to have an implicit credit
and liquidity premium built into the rate that’s reported. This is due to quotes
having these premia included by the bankers that reported their hypothetical
overnight borrowing rates. However, since SOFR and other alternatives are
collateralized rates, there is no way for them to include a credit risk or
liquidity risk premium. This could effectively underrate what the true

Sven Klingler and Olav Syrstad, “Life after Libor”, Journal of Financial Economics
Forthcoming, (October 2020).
1
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reference rate should be, especially for long-term rates outside of daily or
weekly rates2.

II. Challenges of Comparing LIBOR to its Alternatives
Although the markets that are behind many of the alternatives are very
liquid and have been in place for some time, contracts that use these rates are
still quite new and have little liquidity in Fixed Income markets. For example,
although the market mechanisms that shape SOFR (the repo and reverse-repo
markets) have been in place for close to half of a century, SOFR-based
contracts only started to creep into Fixed Income markets in the late 2000s.
Burgess (2020) helps to support this point, showing that Alternative
Reference Rate (ARR) instrument liquidity was still low in early 2019, only 2
years away from complete LIBOR transition. Because of the new market with
new instruments, there is a great opportunity to learn about how they
function and how they differ from LIBOR-based instruments in the past3.
Additionally, the fundamental process of creating LIBOR greatly
contrasts to the process of creating its alternatives. For example, as outlined in
Schrimpf and Sushko (2019), most ARRs are specifically created through
secured transactions in overnight markets. There’s an inherit trade-off in

Klingler and Syrstad, 4.
Nicholas Burgess, “Libor Benchmark Reform: An Overview of Libor Changes and Its
Impact on Yield Curves, Pricing and Risk”, University of Oxford, Saïd Business School, (January
2020).
2
3
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using overnight transactions as a rate. These reference rates will be published
every day, but at the expense of having truly robust and accurate interest
rates for longer-dated tenors, which this paper defines to be longer than 3month term rates4. In Albanese, Iabichino, and Mammola (2021), practitioners
at JP Morgan and Citigroup also note that SOFR and other alternatives have
opposite cyclicalities to banks’ true funding costs. During times of crisis, the
rates will go to zero due to financial markets becoming less liquid as banks’
funding costs soar. Because of the “flight to Treasury” that so often happens
during times of financial crisis, the underlying treasuries that form the
collateral in repo markets become much more valuable. This makes overnight
lending in repo markets basically riskless, which means that, even though
true funding costs soar during times of high risk in financial markets,
overnight repo rates theoretically approach zero5.
Burgess (2020) notes that term rates for alternatives are much less volatile
than historical term rates for LIBOR. Due to the nature of alternatives being
published in-arrears and their term rates being an average of the same period,
there is much less movement than the published LIBOR term rates, which
would often spike unexpectedly during times of crisis like the Great Financial
Crisis. This is a marked difference between the two and will bring up

Andreas Schrimpf and Vladyslav Sushko, “Beyond Libor: A Primer on the New Benchmark
Rates”, Bank for International Settlements, (March 2020).
5 Claudio Albanese, Stefano Iabichino, and Paolo Mammola, “Risk Managing the Libor
Transition”, Social Science Research Network, (May 2021).
4
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complications in this study due to there being less volatility in the rate of
study6.
From Guggenheim and Schrimpf (2020), we find that many end-users of
these contracts prefer a pre-determined rate, especially small-to-medium
sized corporations and retail clients. This is due to the fact that a predetermined rate for their interest rate contracts gives cash flow management
certainty that a market-based ARR simply can’t do. Overall, the switch to
ARRs will increase the cost of borrowing due to the uncertainty added to the
ultimate rate paid. Furthermore, most IT systems and hedging instruments
used by corporations, financial institutions, and retail clients alike use the
cash flow certainty of pre-determined rates to determine funding costs,
among other things. Due to the in-arrears calculation of most ARRs, these
legacy systems must be switched to systems more compatible with in-arrears
calculation7.
Lastly, it must be noted the difference between LIBOR-based contract
and derivative markets and its ARR markets. For one, as Guggenheim and
Schrimpf (2020) points out, there is hardly any market for ARR-based
derivatives, and the little liquidity there is in these markets would quickly
dry up during crises. To have a sufficient reference benchmark, there must be

Burgess 14.
Basil Guggenheim and Andreas Schrimpf, “At the Crossroads in the Transition Away from
LIBOR: From Overnight to Term Rates”, Bank of International Settlements, (October 2020).
6
7
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liquidity in the markets that are underlying and trading the rate8. This was
never a problem for LIBOR, as LIBOR-based contracts and derivatives have
been traded for the past decades. LIBOR, therefore, was often referenced not
only from the quoted form that banks published, but in the underlying
derivatives market that implied a LIBOR rate as well. To solve this problem,
the benchmarks should always reference the ARR itself and not any rate
implied by ARR derivative markets until they become more liquid.
Due to these structural differences between LIBOR and its ARRs, there
is a significant amount to be gained in testing how the two behave differently
during different crises. Testing the key term rates of the major ARRs will
prove very beneficial to understanding the key differences in LIBOR and
ARR markets, and therefore, the markets trading the instruments backed by
these rates.

III. Practitioners Guide on the Transition from LIBOR
Practitioners can give great insight into how these rates will be used going
forward and their opinion on LIBOR substitutes’ advantages and
disadvantages. Because they’re the people that will be faced with hundreds or
thousands of these contracts every year, they have an incredibly large stake in
understanding these rates inside-and-out. For example, Feeney (2019) argues

8

Guggenheim and Schrimpf 12.
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that using a smoothing factor during times of high volatility can help create
benchmark term rates. Because many alternative benchmark rates are
calculated by an average of daily, overnight rates over the term, they’re much
less volatile than LIBOR, which had the disadvantage of small sample sizes
and biases. However, SOFR and other alternatives still show spikes in their
historical back tests, leading researchers to believe that substitutes and
averaging over the highly volatile period can lead to better term rates, closer
to what the true reference rate should be over that period9.
Even though Feeney (2019) uses back testing of SOFR, they’re not
testing the underlying causes of spikes, nor the use cases of backup
benchmarks in cases of high volatility. Therefore, this paper can add to the
discussion given by the Clarus Financial paper. Furthermore, Albanese,
Iabichino, and Mammola (2021) proposed that, in each contract including an
ARR, the lender should include a periodic funding valuation adjustment that
would correct the value shift towards LIBOR. Their reasoning and tests
suggest that, historically, LIBOR has followed the actual funding costs of
banks, as stated previously. However, since SOFR and other ARRs are
oppositely correlated with funding costs of banks, there needs to be some
valuation adjustment in these new contracts that can correct towards LIBOR

John Feeney, “SOFR Impacts from Liquidity Spikes”, Clarus Financial Technology, (May
2019).
9

Murphy 13

for both lending and borrowing parties10. The research within this paper will
translate nicely to applications in practice towards these contracts, since this
paper intends to correct for spikes in benchmark rates during illiquid periods.
If corrections can be found through simpler means, then constantly changing
funding valuation adjustments won’t be necessary within the new ARR
contracts.

10

Albanese, Iabichino, and Mammola 12.
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VI.

Empirical Methods and Data Review
In this section of the paper, the various methods of empirical analysis

and data review will be discussed, including variables of importance, data
selection, data manipulation, problems procuring data, and the methods used
to find results in Econometric tests. Since the topic of ARRs are fairly new to
aggregation databases, such as Bloomberg and Capital IQ, it's imperative to
note the various methods of procurement, manipulation, and data series that
were unable for use.

I. Variables of Importance in Econometric Testing
The goal of this paper is to study volume shocks in the underlying
markets in the calculation of ARRs. Therefore, the main independent variable
of study is the change in overnight volume in tri-party repo transactions. The
market for tri-party repo transactions plays a pivotal role in the short-term
funding of financial institutions and federal agencies alike, so the volume in
the underlying markets are markers for the financial health and funding
needs of these institutions. A repo transaction involves the sale of an asset
with the agreement to buy it back at a predetermined price, with the
difference between the sale price and the repurchase price becoming the
implicit interest rate of this collateralized short-term loan. A shock to this
system overnight will inherently lead to imperfection in the calculation of
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various ARRs that are based on these implicit rates, so the change in
overnight volumes is the main variable of concern in this study.
On the other side of each regression equation is the change in the
spread between the ARR of concern for each test and the Effective Federal
Funds Rate. The two dependent variables of concern in these tests are the
overnight rates for the Secured Overnight Financing Rate (SOFR) and the
Bloomberg Short-Term Bank Yield Index (BSBY). These overnight rates reflect
the overnight funding costs of international, national, and regional banks in
the United States and are of primary concern in the replacement of LIBOR as
a benchmark rate. Furthermore, the overnight rates are used in the calculation
of term rates for longer maturity contracts, which is of great concern for
longer-term financial contracts, such as variable rate mortgages and variable
corporate loans and revolvers. Since the aim of this paper is to test for
divergence of these rates from true funding costs during times of liquidity,
these rates will be spread against the Effective Federal Funds Rate, which
represents the rate at which banks can borrow from each other to meet the
Federal Reserve’s deposit requirements each day.
The spread between the ARR of choice and the Effective Federal Funds
Rate was used for a couple of key reasons. Primarily, the EFFR represents the
rate at which the Federal Reserve believes banks should be able to borrow
from one another on an overnight, unsecured basis. Secondly, the researchers
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Klinger and Syrstad used spreads like these in their regression studies, citing
the need to benchmark the rate to central bank determined rates. Therefore,
this study will use the spread to the EFFR to show “true” spikes in borrowing
rates, where it should show that market-based borrowing rates are diverging
from “expected” borrowing rates published by the Federal Reserve.
However, the funding costs of a bank are not at all completely
determined by their activity in overnight financing markets such as the repo
market. For example, greater macroeconomic trends could be occurring
during these times of illiquidity and should be controlled for in any planned
Econometric tests. Therefore, as a control variable, the change in the Dow
Jones US Bank Index is included in all Econometric tests to control for
underlying economic factors that could be affecting the funding costs of
banks. This composite index tracks the performance of equities in the banking
sector of the US economy, which can be seen as a proxy for overall financial
health within the sector. This specific index was chosen over global or
European bank indices due to its relation to American markets. Because
SOFR and BSBY are mostly being considered as alternative reference rates in
the US, it is more fit to use the USDJBK over global bank indices.
Another factor that must be accounted for in each Econometric test in
this paper is the change in liquidity in Fixed Income derivative markets.
Before its phasing out, LIBOR was derived both explicitly through quotations
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and implicitly through swaps in the overnight derivative markets. Because of
this, a key determinant in variable benchmarks in general is the amount of
activity in swap markets that use the rate. As a control variable in
Econometric tests, this paper uses the overnight changes in the SDRVOIUS
index, which is tracked by Bloomberg services and records the total volume
in US Dollars in Overnight Indexed Swaps markets, dating back to August
2018. This variable will control for any underlying changes in investor
sentiment surrounding the alternative rates and markets that use those rates.
Finally, because this paper is modeled after a study done by Klinger
and Syrstad in their paper, the Econometric tests included will control for
their main variables of interest. As noted before, Klinger and Syrstad studied
the effects of central bank reporting dates on the alternative rate spikes. These
reporting dates included financial quarter end dates, year-end dates, and last
days of each month that are not quarter-end dates. The control variables for
these dates are Quarter, Year, and Month/Quarter, respectively. So, in the levelon-level tests, these indicator variables will be used to show whether the
Klinger and Syrstad test holds for the BSBY Spread. For the levels-on-levels
tests in this paper, the control variables from Klinger and Syrstad that will be
included are the daily changes in total US Treasury Debt. In the original inwork, the researchers also use the changes in Bank Reserves at the Federal
Reserve, but since this a monthly-reported series, it will not be included in
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these daily change tests. Including these variables will make sure that any
effects found in this paper will be independent of the significant results found
in Klinger and Syrstad (2021)1.

II. Data Selection, Manipulation, and Gaps within Data
Due to the wide publication of overnight rates, finding SOFR, BSBY,
and Ameribor series is relatively easy, either using the Federal Reserve
databases or Bloomberg services. However, there are significant differences in
how far back each series is published. For example, SOFR has only been
published by the Federal Reserve as far back as 2017, leaving much of this
paper’s intended study out of reach. However, there are ways to find a decent
proxy for the rate before this published data. In Bowman (2019), there is an
equation cited that takes the General Collateralized Repo Primary Dealer
survey rate and adds a factor of the difference between that survey rate and
the Treasury GCF Repo Rate. The full regression equation can be found
below:
𝑆𝑂𝐹𝑅 = 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑦𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 0.38 ⋅ (𝐺𝐶𝐹 − 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑦𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 − 0.5)
This equation has a remarkable R2 of 99.8% in-sample, meaning that
this equation is almost an exact match to the true SOFR rate before

1

Klingler and Syrstad 5.
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publication2. Therefore, using this regression equation, this paper extends its
study back to 2014, when repo market data first started publishing on
aggregation databases. Additionally, BSBY data reaches back to the start of
2016 and Ameribor to the end of 2015. Because these are lesser-known rates
with more market obscurity, there are less published studies that give proxies
to these rates before their official publishing. Therefore, this paper will start
its study of these two alternatives at the beginning of 2016.
Repo transaction volume is also relatively easy to find due to its
publishing on the Federal Reserve databases every day. The primary concern
in this paper is overnight changes in volumes over a certain threshold and the
volatility in the reference rate throughout the trading days after that change,
so the main independent variable will be the change in overnight volumes in
repo markets. Control variables of concern, including the change in the Dow
Jones Bank Index, the overnight change in OIS market volumes, and the
SRVIX, were also relatively simple to find and match to the variables of
concern in the test, being published by Bloomberg each day.

David Bowman, “Historical Proxies for the Secured Overnight Financing Rate”, FEDS Notes,
(July 2019).
2
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III. Econometric Methods and Testing
To begin, this paper will first determine whether the model, laid out in the
in-work by Klinger and Syrstad, holds for other ARRs. In this case, this paper
will test the announcement dates of the Federal Reserve on the BSBY Spread
to determine whether the results from the 2021 in-work holds for the BSBY.
For this test, the model will be of the form:
(BSBY – EFFR) = β0 + β1*(Quarter) + β2*(Year) + β3*(Month\Quarter)
This model, with three indicator variables, will determine whether the
BSBY has a tendency to spike during reporting dates of the Federal Reserve,
much like Klinger and Syrstad did in their 2021 study for SOFR, ESTR, and
SONIA.
The main concern in any levels-on-levels tests run and any methodology
is the difference in relationship between alternative rates and liquidity during
“normal” market conditions and illiquid market conditions. Therefore, the
majority of testing will contrast the relationship during normal market
conditions and illiquid market conditions. A dummy variable, informally
noted as “2 Sigma Dummy”, will help to distinguish these two conditions.
The two-sigma dummy variable denotes decreases in overnight volumes that
surpass two standard deviations in negative overnight volume changes in triparty repo transactions and the two days of trading following that event. To
contribute to the use of a normal distribution in tracking these abnormal and
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negative volume events, the plot of frequencies in changes in overnight
volume can be found below, indicating an approximation of the normal
distribution.

Exhibit 1: Histogram of Changes in Overnight Volume

Frequencies in Changes in Overnight
Volume
350
300
250
200
150

100
50
0

The planned Econometric tests involve both a levels-on-levels and
difference-in-difference distinction within the tests. This paper hopes to study
the effects of a change in overnight repo volumes, among other changes in
control variables, on the change in the respective ARR spreads. Therefore, it is
distinguished as a levels-on-levels test, rather than testing the level of each
variable on the level of the spread at a certain point. Furthermore, since the
planned tests involve a normal set of variables with no interaction and the
interacted set of variables to show changes to the relationships in times of
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illiquidity, these tests are also difference-in-difference tests. One could think
of the uninteracted variables in each test as a “control” sample and the
variables interacted with the illiquidity indicator variable as the “treatment”
sample. The analysis will then happen in the difference in relationship
between the control sample variables and the treatment sample variables.
Given the definitions above, the first planned econometric levels-onlevels test for each spread variable is of the form:
ΔEFFR Spread = β0 + β1 * (Δ Overnight Volumes) + β2 * (Δ Bank Index) + β3 * (Δ
SDRVOIUS) + β4*(Δ Total Treasury Debt) + β5 * (Δ Overnight Volumes* 2sigma) +
β6 * (Δ Bank Index* 2sigma) + β7 * (Δ SDRVOIUS * 2sigma) + β8*(Δ Total Treasury
Debt*2sigma)
The value of examination will come in testing the incremental
difference between β1 and β6, since that is the primary goal of this paper. Any
differences in other parameters will be noted, but not deeply examined since
they are not a subject of this study.
Secondly, because volatility plays a key role in the study of interest
rate movements, the second set of regressions will interact certain kinds of
volatility with the variables included in the above regressions. These included
variables will increase the importance of explanatory variables during times
of high volatility in underlying market volumes, which will hypothetically
increase the effectiveness of tests run. The volatility chosen for this study is
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the SRVIX, which is the CBOE Interest Rate Volatility Index, which captures
volatility surrounding all interest rates and interest rate derivative contracts.
Lastly, due to the second study that the paper hopes to accomplish, the
empirical section will include regressions of EFFR Spreads between
benchmark rates. This will hopefully show any countercyclicality between
rates for a two-benchmark solution in the future. The planned econometric
tests are shown below.
EFFR Spreadi = β1 *EFFR Spreadj + ui

IV. Testable Hypotheses
Using the analyses above and the research done before, especially in light
of Klingler and Syrstad (2020), this paper posits that (1) the findings in
Klingler and Syrstad (2020) with significance in reporting dates will hold for
the BSBY rate as well, (2) decreases in overnight volume in underlying triparty repo markets larger than two standard deviations will have a
statistically significant and negative impacts on their respective reference rate
spreads to the Effective Federal Funds Rate, resulting in a “spike” of the rate,
and that (3) the SOFR and BSBY rates will prove to be positively and highly
correlated with each other, but Ameribor will prove to be positively
correlated to a much smaller magnitude, indicating evidence that a dual
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benchmark solution could work for interest rate contracts using Ameribor as
a secondary rate.
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VII.

Empirical Analysis and Results

This section of the paper intends to review summary statistics of key
variables, discuss results of Econometric tests that were run, and
contextualize results with hypotheses previously stated and previous
research cited in the paper.

I.

Summary Statistics of Key Variables

With the first test, this paper will show if the Klinger-Syrstad model will
hold for the BSBY Spread. The variables of importance are the Quarter-End
indicator variable, the Year-End indicator variable, and the Month-End
indicator variable. The summary statistics for stated variables are below.

Exhibit 2: Summary Statistics for BSBY Spread Test on K-S Model
Variables in Replication of K-S Tests Observations

Mean

Standard Deviation Minimum

Max

BSBY Spread (Basis Points)

1534

-0.2145

16.56

-61.00

179.00

Quarter-End Indicator Variable

1532

0.0157

0.12

-100.00

123.00

Year-End Indicator Variable

1532

0.0039

0.06

-270.00

282.00

Month-End \ Quarter-End Indicator Variable

1532

0.0320

0.18

-55.63

46.71

We mostly notice here how many “1” observations each of the
indicator variables have: Quarter with 24, Year with 6, and Month\Quarter
with 49. Furthermore, the Spread has an average of -0.21 basis points with a
wide range, indicating that there is a lot of variation to explain and test on.
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With the first of the levels-on-levels tests planned, the main variables of
concern are the overnight changes in the Spread between SOFR and the
Effective Federal Funds Rate, Changes in Overnight Volume, both in
conditions of normality and illiquidity, the Changes in Dow Jones Bank
Index, and the Changes in Total Volume in Overnight Index Swap Markets.
Because the volume metrics for both overnight repo market volume and OIS
market volume are so large, the summary statistics for those measures will be
presented in Billions of USD and Thousands of USD, respectively.
Furthermore, the Spread statistics are denoted in basis points. Below are the
summary statistics for those key variables.

Exhibit 3: Summary Statistics for First Planned Econometric Test on SOFR Spread
Variables in First SOFR Tests

Observations

Mean

Standard Deviation Minimum

Max

1770

1.2900

29.93

-61.00

179.00

102

-19.3400

51.49

-100.00

123.00

Change in Spread (Basis Points)

1872

0.0004

11.02

-270.00

282.00

Change in US Dow Jones Bank Index

1872

-0.1660

6.82

-55.63

46.71

Change in Total Volume in OIS Markets

1872

0.3254

60.36

-362.40

502.12

1872

6.5654

29.07

-86.58

339.11

Changes in O/N Volume in Normality
(Billions of $)
Change in O/N Volume In Illiquidity
(Billions of $)

(Thousands of $)
Change in Total Treasury Debt (Billions of $)

In Exhibit 3, we notice that there are 102 days of trading in the
observation set for days of illiquidity. Of course, since the study includes the
two days after the 2-sigma event occurs, the maximum is going to include
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some outliers where the volume bounces back within the market. That is
exactly the case here, with the maximum overnight repo volume being at 123
in that set of observations. An interesting point to note is that the changes in
overnight volume in normality has a mean close to zero with 1.29, indicating
that the distribution of overnight changes in volume is close to a normal
distribution around zero, as noted earlier in the paper. The inclusion of the
daily changes in treasury debt is to control for the variables from the Klingler
and Syrstad in-work as much as possible, seeing as their levels-on-levels test
included this change variable. One final note from these statistics is that the
change in overnight volume during times of illiquidity has a much higher
standard deviation than the normality overnight volume, indicating that
there’s much volatility to be studied.
The second set of summary statistics will be similar in form to the first,
but will create the summary statistics for the Change in the BSBY Spread and
its related change in volume. The summary statistics are shown below:

Exhibit 4: Summary Statistics for First Planned Econometric Test on BSBY Spread
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Variables in First BSBY Test

Observations

Changes in O/N Volume in Normality

1456

1.260

30.58

-64.00

179.00

Change in O/N Volume In Illiquidity

78

-19.320

52.97

-100.00

123.00

Change in Spread (Basis Points)

1533

-0.014

4.31

-30.25

84.60

Change in US Dow Jones Bank Index

1531

0.156

7.32

-55.63

46.71

Change in Total Volume in OIS Markets

1531

114.600

87.71

-362.40

502.12

1532

7.231

30.25

-86.58

317.59

Mean Standard Deviation Minimum

Max

(Billions of $)

(Thousands of $)
Change in Total Treasury Debt
(Billions of $)

For the BSBY tests that are planned, there is a slightly smaller
observation size, since BSBY data only reaches back to 2016. Therefore, in the
illiquidity side of the test, there are only 78 obsrvations of negative two-sigma
events in the overnight markets, which should still be a sizeable enough
sample size to run the necessary tests. Like the SOFR observation set, there
are bound to be outliers in the minimum and maximums of each variable
because we are working with such a large group of observations. However, in
the Change in Spread summary statistics, we see that the mean is close to
zero, with large outliers on either side, showing that there is much volatility
to be studied.
For the second round of planned tests, this paper will study the effects
that volatility within the broader interest rate market has on these
regressions. In order to do so, each explanatory variable in the regressions
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above will be interacted with the CBOE Interest Rate Volatility Index, labeled
SRVIX in this dataset. This will theoretically give more importance to
explanatory variables during times of high volatility within interest rates,
while minimizing their importance during times of low volatility. The SRVIX
has been scaled to its mean over the time period so that we can draw
meaningful conclusions in individual statistics within SRVIX, such as the
standard deviation, minimum, and maximum. For example, an observation of
1.20 in the Scaled SRVIX variable means that, on this specific day, interest
rates were 20% more volatile in forward looking swap rates than the average
over the period. Below are the summary statistics in this second round of
tests, given the interacted variables in the leftmost column:

Exhibit 5: Summary Statistics for Second Planned Econometric Test on SOFR
Spread
Variables in Second SOFR Tests Observations
Change in Volume in Normality x SRVIX

Mean

Standard Deviation Minimum

Max

1764

1.180

28.69

-67.48

151.47

Change in Volume in Illiquidity x SRVIX

102

-17.790

49.45

-94.28

137.54

Change in Bank Index x SRVIX

1867

0.132

6.52

-46.87

39.60

Change in OIS Volume x SRVIX

1867

0.004

59.59

-423.47

312.51

1867

6.290

28.49

-73.70

381.44

1867

1.000

0.11

0.78

1.31

(Billions of $)

(Thousands of $)
Change in Total Treasury Debt x SRVIX
(Billions of $)
Scaled SRVIX
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These results for some variables are quite surprising, while others are
not so surprising. For example, both the mean and the standard deviation of
changes in overnight volume in both illiquid and normal periods shift
towards zero, indicating that there is a negative correlation between the
forward-looking volatility of interest rates and the changes in overnight repo
market volume. That is, when there are large changes in overnight volume,
they are countered by low forward-looking volatilities, and vice versa with
small changes in overnight volume. This is deeply surprising, given that
you’d expect large changes in markets that determine interest rates to lead to
large changes in those interest rates, which would lead to higher implied
volatility. That is not the case here. Furthermore, there’s very little change in
other explanatory variables, except for a shrinking in the mean in both the
change in bank index and the change in volume in OIS markets. Finally, as
expected, the mean of scaled SRVIX is 1 (because it was forced towards 1),
while the standard deviation is around 11%, meaning there is good variation
within this interacted series to study.

Exhibit 6: Summary Statistics for the Second Planned Econometric Test on BSBY
Spread
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Variables in Second BSBY Test Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum
Change in Volume in Normality x SRVIX

Max

1448

1.180

30.19

-74.61

155.00

78

-18.160

50.94

-97.10

141.65

Change in Bank Index x SRVIX

1526

0.143

7.12

-48.27

40.78

Change in OIS Volume x SRVIX

1526

-0.002

92.53

-436.12

321.85

1526

7.015

29.98

-75.90

333.60

1526

1.000

0.11

0.80

1.35

(Billions of $)
Change in Volume in Illiquidity x SRVIX
(Billions of $)

(Thousands of $)
Change in Total Treasury Debt x SRVIX
(Billions of $)
Scaled SRVIX

Similar to the summary statistics from the second SOFR spread test,
the means and standard deviation for both change in volume variables have
shrunk towards zero, indicating negative correlations with forward looking
interest rate volatilities. One interesting note here is that the interacted change
in OIS Volume variable shows much more volatility in this set of observations
in comparison to the SOFR observations, as shown by a much higher
standard deviation. One potential explanation is that the overnight changes in
OIS Volumes have become much larger over time as the market has increased
in participants, thereby having larger fluctuations in transactions as time has
gone on.
The final planned test of this study are correlative studies of each
spread to find if there exists any countercyclicalities in the rates. The
combined summary statistics can be found below:
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Exhibit 7: Summary Statistics for Planned Spread Cyclicality Econometric Test
Variables in Correlative Spread Test Observations

Mean

Standard Deviation

Minimum

Max

SOFR Spread (SOFR - EFFR)

1532

-0.002

0.17

-1.49

0.37

BSBY Spread (BSBY - EFFR)

1532

-0.029

0.21

-1.58

3.21

Ameribor Spread (Ameribor - EFFR)

1532

0.084

0.21

-1.42

0.49

When compared side-by-side, there is not much difference between the
SOFR and BSBY spreads, other than their maximum values (due to a blip in
SOFR calculation in September 2019). However, there is a marked difference
in the summary statistics of the two rates and Ameribor. For one, the mean
spread over the period is positive and close to four times larger than the
SOFR spread. This is due to the fact that Ameribor is primarily an unsecured
rate, which means there is an inherent credit spread imbued in the rate. This
pushes the average up, while keeping the standard deviation in line with the
other two spreads. It is interesting to note, however, that the minimum of the
Ameribor spread is pretty close to that of the BSBY and SOFR spreads. In any
case, this data is promising that there is some countercyclicality between
Ameribor and the two similar spreads.

II.

Results of Econometric Tests

This section will discuss the various results of the planned econometric
tests that have been mentioned above. One asterisk above variable names in
exhibits indicates significance at the 90% confidence level, two asterisks above
variable names indicates significance at the 95% confidence level, and three

Murphy 33

asterisks above variable names indicates significance at the 99% confidence
level.
a) BSBY Spread Tests on K-S Model
Exhibit 8: BSBY Spread Level Econometric Test on K-S Model

BSBY Spread

Coeff.

Quarter-End

-3.21227

t-statistics
-0.78

3.92838
Year-End*

14.83500

1.90

7.80873
Month-End \ Quarter-End

-0.46596

-0.19

2.40581
Constant

-0.20657

-0.48

0.43367
R^2

0.24%

Interestingly enough, the results from Klinger and Syrstad do not
apply to the BSBY Spread as well as they did to the SOFR Spread, among
other ARRs in that test such as ESTR and SONIA. The Quarter-End and
Month-End variables are not statistically significant with the BSBY rate, with
the Year-End variable only being statistically significant above the 90%
confidence level. One explanation for the lack of explanatory power from the
date indicator variables is that the securities that are traded within the BSBY
markets are not directly affected by Federal Reserve announcement dates.
SOFR and other ARRs are made up of repo transactions, most of which use
treasuries as collateral. Since the markets underlying the BSBY Index are
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mostly made up of Commercial Paper and Certificate of Deposit trades,
announcement dates would affect the calculation of the rate less than SOFR.
Therefore, this result makes a little sense, but it is still unfortunate that we can
not use the same research as Klinger and Syrstad and apply it to the BSBY
Index.
b) SOFR Spread Econometric Tests
Exhibit 7: SOFR Econometric Test and Coefficients under Normal Conditions
SOFR Spread in Normality

Coeff.

Change in O/N Volume

0.04000

(Billions of $) ***

0.00861

Change in Dow Jones US Bank Index

-0.00650

t-statistics
4.65

-0.17

0.03761
Change in Total Volume in OIS Markets

-0.00078

(Thousands of $)

0.00414

Change in Spread L1 ***

-0.28593

-0.19

-12.79

0.02235
Change in Total Treasury Debt

0.00537

(Billions of $)

0.00862

Constant

-0.09575

0.62

-0.38

0.25133

R^2

8.78%

Exhibit 8: SOFR Spread Econometric Test and Coefficients under Illiquidity
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SOFR Spread In Illiqudity

Coeff.

Change in O/N Volume

-0.04751

(Billions of $) **

0.02117

Change in Dow Jones US Bank Index

0.02990

t-statistics
-2.24

0.24

0.12401

Change in Total Volume in OIS Markets

0.01130

(Thousands of $)

0.02013

Change in Spread L1

0.17758

0.56

0.78

0.22880
Change in Total Treasury Debt

-0.00383

(Billions of $)

0.03749

R^2

8.78%

-0.10

Here we see the results of the first Econometric test run for the levels-onlevels analysis. The variables in Exhibit 7 are the variable of interest and the
control variables that have not been interacted with the 2-sigma dummy
variable. In Exhibit 8, the variables included have been interacted with the 2sigma dummy variable. Therefore, the coefficients and statistics in the second
table represent a change in the relationship between these variables and the
change in spread during times of illiquidity. The main variable of concern, the
change in overnight volumes, shows a significant difference in relationship
during times of illiquidity than in normality. Above a 95% confidence level,
this test shows that the relationship inverts during severe drops in overnight
volumes, so that the change in the SOFR Spread will be positive and
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significant. Other than that, the other explanatory variables, such as the
change in the bank index, change in volume in OIS Markets, and the lagged
change in SOFR spread are all statistically insignificant and close to zero in
their effect on the change in SOFR Spread. On another note, the addition of
these variables shows that the Klinger and Syrstad variables included, the
daily change in total treasury debt, becomes insignificant when taking into
account change in the bank index, change in the volume in OIS markets, and
the lagged change variable.
These first results indicate that the initial hypothesis was correct. Given a
negative and statistically significant coefficient on the change in volume term
in Exhibit 8, we can see that a negative shock to overnight volume during
times of illiquidity will cause a spike in the SOFR spread to the EFFR.
However, promising as these results may be, the R2 on this initial
Econometric test is a lowly R2 of 8.78%, indicating that more variation could
be explained by these variables.
Even with good preliminary results to show that there is a marked
difference in the relationship between the SOFR Spread and the change in
overnight repo volume in times of illiquidity, the F-test to determine
difference between the two coefficients is shown in the appendix as Exhibit
191. With a probability of 0.07% that the two change in repo transaction

1

See Page 54
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volume variables are actually redundant within this test, this shows that there
is an important difference between the two variables with confidence.
The final planned tests for the change in the SOFR Spread include an
interaction with the Interest Rate Volatility Index, noted as SRVIX in this
paper. The inclusion of this interaction on explanatory variables will
hopefully produce more importance during times of high volatility in interest
rates, while decreasing importance of explanatory variables during times of
low volatility. The importance of this interaction is to show what happens to
the explanatory variables when the national and regional bank’s funding
costs are in flux, which is represented by increasing volatility in forwardlooking interest rates. The results of the regression with the interacted
variables can be found below.

Exhibit 9: SOFR Spread Test and Coefficients (Normal Conditions) with Volatility
Interaction
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SOFR Spread In Normality

Coeff.

Change in Volume X SRVIX

-0.0570

t-statistics
-0.72

0.0792
Change in DJUSBK X SRVIX

-0.0863

-0.27

Variables

Coeff.

Change in O/N Volume

0.0963

(Billions of $)

0.0777

Change in Dow Jones US Bank Index

0.3179
Change in TVOIS X SRVIX

0.0508

0.1053

1.22

0.26

Change in Total Volume in OIS

-0.0520

Markets (Thousands of $)

0.0420

Change in Spread L1

-0.3865

0.4084
Change in Treasury Debt X SRVIX

-0.0403

-0.4572

0.25

-1.24

-0.99

0.3898
-0.49

Change in Treasury Debt

0.0823
SRVIX

1.24

0.3056

0.0415
Change in Spread L1 X SRVIX

0.0766

t-statistics

0.0447

0.55

0.0812
-0.21

2.1801
Constant

0.3864

0.18

2.1964
R^2

8.97%

Exhibit 10: SOFR Spread Test and Coefficients (Illiquid Conditions) with Interacted
Volatility
SOFR Spread In Illiqudity
Volume X SRVIX

Coeff.
0.1966

t-statistics
0.96

0.2045
DJUSBK X SRVIX

0.4514

0.28

Variables
Change in O/N Volume

0.0799

0.1963

Change in Dow Jones US Bank Index

-0.3799

-2.3494

0.37

-0.5

Change in Total Volume in OIS

-0.0626

Markets (Thousands of $)

0.2075

Change in Spread L1

4.7090
Change in Treasury Debt X SRVIX

0.0217
0.6062

R^2

t-statistics
-1.20

-0.26

1.4392

0.2153
Spread L1 X SRVIX

-0.2357

(Billions of $)

1.6060
TVOIS X SRVIX

Coeff.

2.3634

-0.30

0.54

4.3683
0.04

Change in Treasury Debt

-0.0313

-0.06

0.5462

8.97%

In comparison to the first regressions run on the SOFR Spread, much
has changed in terms of importance and statistical significance between the
explanatory variables. For example, the interaction variable for overnight
changes in repo transactions has a positive, but insignificant coefficient. This
relationship points in the opposite direction of the relationship established in
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the first test run in this section. Therefore, we can see that the interaction of
continuous volatility actually diminishes the importance of the independent
variables in their explanatory power on the change in SOFR Spread.
Furthermore, no explanatory variables have statistically significant
coefficients above a 90% confidence level, meaning that the interaction has
severely diminished the actual explanatory power of these variables. The
regression R2 is 8.97%, showing that not much more variation is explained by
the inclusion of the interacted variables.
Because this last regression is very similar to the first regression,
despite the lowering of significance for the explanatory variables, we can
expect similar results in the F-test to show difference in the coefficients. Here,
the probability that the two coefficients are different is 0.5%, giving us more
than 99% confidence that the relationship between the overnight changes in
volume in repo markets and the change in the SOFR Spread is different
during times of illiquidity in those markets than in times of normality.
However, since the coefficients are not significant on their own, not much
importance in difference can be gleaned from the results of this F-test.

c) BSBY Econometric Tests
To establish consistency between the tests of the change in SOFR Spread
and the change in BSBY Spread, the planned Econometric tests are exactly
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similar to those in the previous section. However, there will be comparisons
drawn due to their similarity in chapters to come, noting the difference in
relationships between the two spreads and their respective volumes. The first
regressions run for the BSBY Spread are shown below without the volatility
interactions.

Exhibit 11: BSBY Econometric Test and Coefficients under Normal Conditions
BSBY Spread In Normality

Coeff.

Change in O/N Volume

0.005072

(Billions of $)

0.003660

Change in Dow Jones US Bank Index

-0.00337

t-statistics
1.39

-0.22

0.01544
Change in Total Volume in OIS

-0.00115

Markets (Thousands of $)

0.00171

Change in Spread L1

-0.01762

-0.67

-0.66

0.02672
Change in Total Treasury Debt

0.005762

(Billions of $)

0.00369

Constant

-0.05542

1.56

-0.49

0.11243
R^2

2.97%

Exhibit 12: BSBY Econometric Test and Coefficients under Illiquid Conditions
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BSBY Spread In Illiqudity

Coeff.

Change in O/N Volume

-0.016476

(Billions of $) *

0.0095245

Change in Dow Jones US Bank Index 0.0336625

t-statistics
-1.73

0.57

0.0593873
Change in Total Volume in OIS

0.006633

Markets (Thousands of $)

0.0099545

Change in Total Treasury Debt

-0.002849

(Billions of $)

0.0172357

Change in Spread L1***

0.5063543

0.67

-0.17

5.86

0.0864389
R^2

2.97%

Here, we see that there is no statistical significance to the relationship
between the change in overnight volumes and the change in the BSBY Spread
during times of normality, but that changes to a statistically significant and
negative relationship during times of illiquidity in the market at a 90%
confidence level. Furthermore, both the USDJBK Index and the OIS market
volumes are not significant in both times of normality and illiquidity.
Furthermore, like the change in the SOFR Spread tests above, the daily
change in total treasury debt is neither explanatory during normality nor
illiquidity in the repo markets, although it is slightly significant during
normality. The only explanatory variables that show high significance in
these tests are the lagged change in spread variables, indicating that the BSBY
Spread has some friction associated with it. As for explaining variation in the

Murphy 42

spread, the changes in volumes here do a much worse job than that of the
first tests, producing an R2 of 2.97%.
Looking towards Exhibit 21 in the Appendix2, we notice that the F-test
between normality and illiquidity results in a confidence level of 94% that the
relationship changes during times of illiquidity. This is a great sign for the
first hypothesis, given that there is a significantly different relationship
between times of illiquidity and times of normality for the changes in the
BSBY Spread.
Lastly, like before, the interaction of the SRVIX with the explanatory
variables will prove key to drawing out importance during times of high
volatility (i.e., when bank’s funding costs rise), and minimizing their
importance when volatility in interest rates is low. The results of the
regression are shown below.

Exhibit 13: BSBY Spread Test and Coefficients (Normal Conditions) with Volatility
Interaction

2

See Page 54
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BSBY Spread In Normality

Coeff.

Change in Volume X SRVIX

-0.0190

t-statistics
-0.53

0.0357
Change in DJUSBK X SRVIX

0.0729

0.55

Variables

Coeff.

Change in O/N Volume

0.0235

(Billions of $)

0.0352

Change in Dow Jones US Bank Index

-0.0729

0.1334
Change in TVOIS X SRVIX

0.0183

-0.7137

1.09

-2.31

Change in Total Volume in OIS

-0.0200

Markets (Thousands of $)

0.0175

Change in Spread L1**

0.3092
Change in Treasury Debt X SRVIX

0.0008

-0.6022

-0.56

-1.14

0.6924

2.24

0.3090
0.02

Change in Treasury Debt

0.0362
SRVIX

0.67

0.1300

0.0169
Change in Spread L1 X SRVIX**

t-statistics

0.0046

0.13

0.0360
-0.57

1.0523
Constant

0.6754

0.65

1.0325
R^2

4.16%

Exhibit 14: BSBY Spread Test and Coefficients (Illiquid Condition) with Volatility
Interaction
BSBY Spread In Illiqudity
Volume X SRVIX

Coeff.
-0.0564

t-statistics
-0.47

0.1193
DJUSBK X SRVIX

0.1528

0.16

Variables
Change in O/N Volume

-0.2654

0.1144

Change in Dow Jones US Bank Index

-0.0784

-0.0380

-1.10

-0.12

Change in Total Volume in OIS

0.2594

Markets (Thousands of $)

0.2298

Change in Treasury Debt

0.3065
Spread L1 X SRVIX***

11.9387
3.4527

R^2

0.31

-0.10

0.8001

0.2409
Change in Treasury Debt X SRVIX

t-statistics

0.0354

(Billions of $)

0.8541
TVOIS X SRVIX

Coeff.

0.0386

1.13

0.13

0.2885
3.46

Change in Spread L1***

-10.9897

-3.31

3.3198

4.16%

Given the regression run with the interacted variables, there are a
couple interesting things to note. Like before with the SOFR Spread, all
variables have lost a decent amount of significance with the inclusion of the
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volatility-interacted terms. This is to be expected because the inclusion of any
terms will most likely weaken the explanatory power of individual variables.
However, there are now no statistically significant variables to high degrees
of confidence. Furthermore, many of the interacted terms point in opposite
directions to their regular counterparts, such as the overnight change in
volumes in illiquidity and in normality. This probably means that the
interacted terms are redundantly included. Lastly, the inclusion of interacted
terms increases the explanatory power of the test by about 1.5 percentage
points compared to the first regression, giving this test an R2 of 4.16%.
However, even though the two coefficients on the change in volumes
are not statistically significant on their own, there is still some proof that
there’s a difference between the two relationships as it relates to the change in
the BSBY Spread. The F-Test, shown in Exhibit 22 in the Appendix3, gives a
probability of 4.78% that the two variables inclusion are redundant in this
test, meaning that there is still a significant difference in the relationship
between overnight changes in volume and the change in the BSBY Spread
during times of normality and illiquidity.

3

See Page 54
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d) Dual Benchmark Tests
The final part of this Econometric study plans to test for low correlations
and close to zero relationships between spread variables. The hope is that, if a
pair of these spread variables have a low correlation and no causal
relationship between each other, then they can be used in conjunction in
interest rate contracts. In other words, when one rate becomes untethered
from the EFFR and true funding costs, another can take its place and serve as
the reference rate for a period of time. Like stated before, the hypothesis
within this section is that Ameribor, as an unsecured rate dealing with the
funding costs of regional banks, will have a low correlation with the other
two rates and will have little causal relationship between the drivers of said
rates.
The first part of this study involves a correlation matrix between
spread variables. The results of the study are found below.

Exhibit 15: Spread Correlation Matrix
EFFR Spread Correlation Matrix
BSBY

SOFR

BSBY

1.000

SOFR

0.787

1.000

Ameribor

0.908

0.805

Ameribor

1.000
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Contrary to the stated hypothesis, all three spreads have high
correlations with one another, with Ameribor having the highest correlations
with the two spreads in question. This result, although disappointing in terms
of the hypothesis, is to be expected, since the drivers of all three rates and
respective spreads to the EFFR are similar: the funding costs of banks. The
regional, national, or international identities of said banks seems to be less
important than initially theorized. However, there is still some space to show
that there is no causal link between the drivers of the spreads, which will be
shown through a trio of regressions between the three spreads in question.

Exhibit 16: SOFR Spread Regressed on BSBY Spread

SOFR Spread

Coeff.

BSBY Spread***

1.00916

t-statistics
29.92

0.020217
Constant***

-0.02641

-7.89

0.00335

Exhibit 17: SOFR Spread Regressed on Ameribor Spread

SOFR Spread

Coeff.

Ameribor Spread***

0.83027

t-statistics
53.14

0.015625
Constant***

-0.09815
0.00347

Exhibit 18: BSBY Spread Regressed on Ameribor Spread

-28.25
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BSBY Spread

Coeff.

Ameribor Spread***

0.730305

t-statistics
84.88

0.008604
Constant***

-0.06334

-33.11

0.00191

It’s clear to see, given these three tests, that all three rate spreads have
relationships between the drivers of the rates. This was assumed between
SOFR and BSBY, given that they’re more national rates, derived by the
activity of larger rates, but it’s interesting to note that the lowest amount of
variation is explained in the regressions without Ameribor, when it was
hypothesized that the lowest t-statistics and R2 values would come in the
other two regressions. In any case, these tests and the correlation matrix
ultimately disprove the hypothesis that there are smaller correlations between
SOFR/BSBY and Ameribor.

III.

Contextualization of Results

The regression results found above can be deceiving in terms of their
magnitude, given how small the coefficients are and the large scale of the
independent variables. For example, in the first regression on the change in
the SOFR Spread, the variable of interest, the overnight change in repo
market volume during illiquid markets, has a statistically significant
coefficient of -0.0475112 and a standard error of 0.0211719. In real terms, the
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change in the SOFR Spread is stated in basis points, while the overnight
volume variables are expressed in billions of USD. Given those data
definitions, a $100 Billion dollar decrease in overnight repo market activity
will move the SOFR Spread to the EFFR by about 4.75 basis points,
controlling for other market variables. That’s still incredibly small on its own!
The economic importance should not be lost in the magnitude of these
results, however. During its peak usage, there were an estimated $200 Trillion
in interest rate contracts that referenced USD LIBOR as its main reference
rate4. Given that SOFR is the pick from the ARCC and Federal Reserve to be
the new reference rate on variable rate contracts, it’s no overstatement that
the amount in SOFR contracts going forward will exceed that of the USD
LIBOR contracts in the past. With that said, even a one basis point movement
in the spread to the EFFR overnight will have major implications to the value
of these contracts. A sustained period of illiquidity following these market
shocks would be devastating for the lenders of variable rate debt.
Similar effects are found within the BSBY Spread regressions, where a
negative overnight change in $100 Billion of volume moves the BSBY Spread
by around 1.5 basis points. However, there are much less projected contracts
that will be using BSBY as a reference rate than SOFR. The “stamp of

The Alternative Reference Rates Committee, “Progress Report: The Transition from U.S.
Dollar LIBOR”, NewYorkFed.org, The New York Federal Reserve Bank, March 31, 2021.
4
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approval” by the ARCC and the Federal Reserve means that the relationship
between volume shocks in overnight repo markets are much more
economically important to SOFR-based contracts than to BSBY-based
contracts. There isn’t a good estimate as to how many lenders and
practitioners will be using BSBY as a reference rate going forward, but the
sentiment in Fixed Income markets as of today shows a favoring of SOFR
over other rates.
Finally, the correlational testing between the interest rate spreads
served to disprove the third hypothesis. Given the high correlations between
the rates and the similarity between the drivers of said rates, it would be
unwise and, frankly, a waste of time to pair any of three in a “dual
benchmark” contract or index. Even so, there still could be a marketdetermined interest rate that show little correlation to the three mentioned
above. Further studies into a dual benchmark solution could prove very
useful in determining solutions to market-related spikes in the SOFR Spread.
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VIII. Conclusion
As stated previously in the summary of empirical results, there was
mixed success in proving hypotheses within this paper. For example, there
was proven to be a negative relationship between downward shocks in
volume and the spread between ARRs and the EFFR. This relationship,
depending on control variables included, changed significantly between
normality conditions and illiquid conditions. However, the variation in the
rate spreads was not well explained with just shocks in overnight volumes in
repo markets and control variables for underlying financial health in banks.
The Econometric models that explained the most variation in spreads to the
Effective Federal Funds Rate were the models that included the lagged
spread variables, in which most of the variation was explained by the
additional lagged variable. Within these models, most variables of
importance become less statistically significant and relevant to the
explanation of spread variation. Even so, with the results from both SOFR
and BSBY, we can conclude that the first test hypothesis was moderately
proven with a few key conditions.
Oppositely, the second test hypothesis in this paper was staunchly
rejected by the Econometric tests run. Stated previously in the paper, the goal
was to find a near-zero correlation within alternative reference rates that
could have served as a back-up benchmark rate. This could have been helpful
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when a market-determined rate, such as SOFR, strays too far from true
funding costs and no longer meaningfully represents the overnight funding
costs of national and regional banks. It was thought that, since the Ameribor
rate of the American Financial Exchange was a regional bank rate with an
implied credit spread, it would have less correlation with SOFR and BSBY.
However, the lowest correlation in rates was found between SOFR and BSBY,
and even then, the correlation was still a very high 78.7%. Because of these
results, the second hypothesis has been disproven and there is no application
in a dual benchmark solution for these three rates.
An interesting note, apart from the primary study of this paper, is that
results diverge from the paper that this study is modeled after by a fair
amount. The Quarter and Year variables were included due to their inclusion
in the paper by Klingler and Syrstad (2020). All three date indicator variables
were proven to be statistically significant and positive in the SOFR Spread
studies. However, both Quarter and Month variables were insignificant in all
BSBY Spread tests. One possible explanation for this divergence is the
underlying assets that are being traded. For SOFR, the instruments used in
transactions are directly influenced by Federal Reserve announcements and
policies. The assets used in the calculation of BSBY, Commercial Paper and
Certificates of Deposit, are less influenced by any policy changes from the
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Federal Reserve. It would stand to reason, then, that BSBY is relatively
unaffected by those policy announcement dates.
However, even though the tests within this paper show that a dual
benchmark couldn’t work between these three rates, it doesn’t preclude the
notion that it couldn’t work in general. There are many other published
alternative reference rates that could theoretically work in tandem with SOFR
and BSBY. Further topics of research that could build on this paper could test
more alternative rates, doing a deeper dive into the drivers of said rates and
working within those drivers to find less correlation among them. In the
Econometric tests above, it was found that the drivers of the three rates in
question were very similar: they all stemmed from the funding needs of
banks, whether regional, national, or international.
Furthermore, although the illiquid shocks in overnight volumes were
found to be statistically significant in some cases, there shocks were only
tested on overnight rates. It would be an interesting addition to the research
here to find the effects on the term rates determined from these overnight
rates and whether there is still a significant impact on longer maturity rates.
The term rates for both SOFR and BSBY are calculated by weighted averaging
throughout the calculation period, so the overnight rates have an impact
(albeit a small impact) on the calculation of the larger term rates. Because
many of the financial contracts that use SOFR and BSBY use their term rates,
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it would be important to know the impacts that are drawn out from the
overnight spikes.
It’s apparent that more goes into ARR Spread spikes than just illiquid
shocks to transaction volumes. However, much of the variation in spikes
during illiquid crises can be attributed to shocks in volume, relative financial
health, and changes in activity in other markets. It will be crucial to find
methods to “smooth” alternative rates for the calculation of term rates in the
future to make sure that market participants and market volumes don’t
weigh too much on the calculation of said rates.
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X.

Appendix

Exhibit 19: F-Test for Coefficient Difference in First SOFR Spread Test
F-Test for Coefficient Difference
(1) ChangeinONVolume - Change_in_VolSigma = 0
F( 1, 1863) = 11.62
Prob > F = 0.0007

Exhibit 20: F-Test for Coefficient Difference in Second SOFR Spread Test
F-Test for Coefficient Difference
(1) ChangeinONVolume - Change_in_VolSigma = 0
F( 1, 1856) = 7.89
Prob > F = 0.005

Exhibit 21: F-Test for Coefficient Difference in First BSBY Spread Test
F-Test for Coefficient Difference
(1) ChangeinONVolume - Change_in_VolSigma = 0
F( 1, 1523) = 3.54
Prob > F = 0.0600

Exhibit 22: F-Test for Coefficient Difference in Second BSBY Spread Test
F-Test for Coefficient Difference
(1) ChangeinONVolume - Change_in_VolSigma = 0
F( 1, 1516) = 3.93
Prob > F = 0.0478

